Laurel’s goal is to create an analogy between theatre and computer design, but she introduces psychology early in her chapter. Unfortunately, she seems to drop psychology and only focus on drama. Had she more carefully thought about psychology, she could have used both fields to support her argument. Instead, she sets up the differences between psychology and drama (rather simplistically) by giving the following definitions:
In general, psychology attempts to describe what goes on in the real world with all its fuzziness and loose ends, while theatre attempts to represent something that might go on, simplified for the purposes of logical and affective clarity. Psychology is devoted to the end of explaining human behavior, while drama attempts to represent it in a form that provides intellectual and emotional closure. Theatre is informed by psychology (both professional and amateur flavors), but it turns a trick that is outside of psychology's province through the art of representing action. (6)
While it may be one goal of psychology to “explain human behavior,” that is not the only goal of the field. It could be argued, quite easily, that one goal of psychology is to “provide intellectual and emotional closure,” which Laurel reserves for theatre. Also, her claim that “the art of representing action” is “outside of psychology’s province” is not well informed at all. One only has to think of the act of role-playing, writing letters to those who have caused us pain with no intention of sending them, or relaxation techniques that involve imagining a safe place to see that psychology is mired in representation. Along with that, the field of psychology is built upon Freud’s ideas that dreams are representations, and that psychological disorders have their origins in representation.
Nonetheless, Laurel makes her claim that interface design is equivalent to theatre. She talks about how the actions on the screen are only representations of “real” actions, and how these representations pose problems for designers. She mentions several times about “barking up the wrong tree” (14, 20), and I think that she may be doing so when she tries to talk about real worlds and actions versus representations of these.
She talks about how users may switch modes from experiential to productive when interacting with the computer. In defining productive modes, she calls to the “seriousness vis-à-vis the real world” (23) of the outcomes of productivity. She even admits that “a printed paper … has ‘real’ implications … even though it is itself a representation” (23). If she would take this realization a step further, she would see that even the “concreteness” she is concerned with is a representation. The printing on the paper, the words we speak, the “language” we use for thought are all representations with no grounding in the objects we are representing. And going even further, many philosophers have argued that the “real” world is just what is represented to us through our perceptions. So instead of focusing on how representation may cause problems, perhaps it would be more useful to use psychology’s “attempts to describe what goes on in the ‘real’ world” and figure out the different ways that different representations pose problems of interaction. Much like the attempt to use linguistic theories to help understand interactivity, an understanding that all interaction relies on representation and metaphor will help designers understand how to create more effective interfaces, instead of more “realistic” ones.
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